-
Northern District Of Illinois Denies Motion To Dismiss Right-To-Repair Complaint Against A Manufacturer Of Agricultural Equipment
06/24/2025On June 09, 2025, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied a motion to dismiss filed by a manufacturer of agricultural equipment (“Defendant”) in a right-to-repair action brought by the Federal Trade Commission (“the FTC”), accompanied by five states (Arizona, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin). FTC v. Deere & Co., No. 25-CV-50017 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2025). Defendant moved to dismiss on grounds, inter alia, that the FTC failed to establish (i) a monopolization claim in violation of Sherman Act §2 and (ii) an unfair competition claim in violation FTC Act §5. In denying Defendant’s motion, the district court held the FTC plausibly alleged that (1) Defendant enjoyed monopoly power in the aftermarket for agricultural equipment repair and (2) Defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct by limiting access to its repair tools.
The complaint stems from Defendant’s repair ecosystem for its high-tech tractors. Defendant’s modern lines of equipment are designed to function on electronic control units. If problems arise with these units, issues can only be diagnosed or fixed using Defendant’s proprietary “Service ADVISOR” software. Defendant licenses the Service ADVISOR repair software to “Authorized Dealers.”
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant asserted that the FTC failed to plausibly allege anticompetitive conduct in violation of antitrust laws. Defendant claimed that the FTC failed to allege a cognizable aftermarket, within the meaning articulated by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc. (504 U.S. 451 (1992)). In Kodak, the Supreme Court found that a cognizable aftermarket “involves the inability of the customer to determine [the] ‘all in cost’ or ‘life cycle’ cost for the product.” (In re Deere & Co. Repair Servs. Antitrust Litig., 703 F. Supp. 3d 862, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2023)). Defendant argued that the FTC failed the Kodak analysis because farmers have long known about the limitations and restrictions on repair services for Defendant’s equipment. Thus, any purchaser of Defendant’s equipment would be able to assess the “life cycle” costs to maintain and repair the equipment. Moreover, Defendant stated that it is not a participant in the market for equipment repair. Defendant emphasized that only independently owned dealers perform repairs. As such, Defendant cannot compete in, let alone monopolize or exercise unfair methods of competition, in the equipment repair market.
The FTC alleged that Defendant, by licensing the full version of the Service ADVISOR tool exclusively to Authorized Dealers, would steer farmers and independent repair providers to a single, Defendant-controlled channel for parts and service. Moreover, the FTC claims that farmers lack transparency about lifetime repair costs when they purchase the machines. As a result, Defendant’s customers become locked into a costly aftermarket in which Defendant and its Authorized Dealers reap “massive profits” from supracompetitive service and parts prices.
Specifically, the FTC alleged that Defendant possessed monopoly power in two single-brand aftermarkets—fully functional repair tools and “restricted” repair services—because it alone controls access to Service ADVISOR. As alleged, this enables Defendant to dictate price and output for the associated repair services. By withholding the tool from farmers and independent repair providers, the FTC argued Defendant foreclosed competition, inflated parts prices, and forced growers to endure costly delays that jeopardized crop yields and food supplies.
The district court disagreed with Defendant, finding the FTC had plausibly alleged both monopoly power and associated anticompetitive conduct. The court rejected Defendant’s insistence on a rigid “category” label, explaining that antitrust analysis focuses on the effect on competition rather than formalistic classifications. First, the district court held that Defendant’s exclusive licensing of Service ADVISOR plausibly allows it to control prices and exclude competition in the repair aftermarkets. Next, the district court found that Defendant’s power in the repair market—its ability to unilaterally influence the costs for repair services and limit the number of license recipients—meant that consumers could not effectively “estimate with certainty” the lifetime repair costs for Defendant’s equipment. Thus, the FTC had sufficiently plead a cognizable aftermarket under Kodak. With a cognizable aftermarket identified, and drawing inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the court determined the FTC sufficiently alleged facts that purport to show Defendant’s intent to maintain its monopoly through the restricted licensing of the Service ADVISOR software, thereby harming competition. Hence, the district court found a triable issue of antitrust injury.
This ruling represents a significant outcome at the intersection of antitrust law and the “right-to-repair” movement. The decision keeps alive a challenge which, at its core, seeks to limit the ability of a company to use exclusive licensing contracts as a means for supplying products only to designated “authorized dealers.” The decision also underscores that aftermarket theories remain a viable space for applying antitrust law, putting manufacturers on notice that exerting control over essential repair tools or software may be susceptible to antitrust claims, even if the manufacturer does not themselves perform repairs.
