Florida Judge Grants Motion to Dismiss Section 2 Monopolization Claim

On June 16, 2026, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Judge Roy K. Altman, granted in full a motion to dismiss a Miami-based boat brokerage’s monopolization allegations against the operator of the three largest online platforms that connect buyers and sellers of recreational boats in the United States.  Plaintiff alleged that Defendant had unlawfully acquired, maintained, and expanded monopoly power in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Florida Antitrust Act, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, seeking treble damages, injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees.  The Court dismissed the two federal Section 2 counts without prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the three state-law counts.  Plaintiff has until June 30, 2026, to file an amended complaint.

A monopolization claim under Section 2 requires both (1) the possession of monopoly power in a relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power, as distinguished from growth resulting from a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.  The Court found that Plaintiff adequately pled a relevant market (online marine vessel listing and marketing services in the United States) and monopoly power, relying on allegations that Defendant publicly claims roughly 75% of the global market and operates the leading U.S. platforms with no comparable domestic rival.  The Court also found Plaintiff’s pleading of a distinct, online submarket carved out from the traditional advertising channels such as newspapers and magazines persuasive, noting that the online platforms provide specialized tools for inventory management and sales.

The claim failed, however, on the second element, as each of Plaintiff’s three theories of exclusionary conduct fell short.  In the Court’s view, the “strategic” acquisitions of competitors (largely dating to 2004 and 2017) were not alleged to have any anticompetitive effect and reflected lawful growth through business acumen.  Further, the Court found that the contractual term Plaintiff characterized as an “exclusive dealing” provision merely barred customers from misrepresenting the source of their listings and did not prevent brokers from advertising on rival platforms, and in any event was not alleged to foreclose competition in a substantial share of the market.  Finally, the Court agreed with Defendant that the steep, sustained price increases—allegedly more than 400% over a decade—were not, standing alone, anticompetitive, because “the mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices,” is lawful absent accompanying exclusionary conduct, citing the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.  Because Plaintiff failed to plead anticompetitive conduct, its attempted-monopolization claim—which demands the same conduct plus specific intent—necessarily failed as well, and the Court dismissed the pendent state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

The case is Brill Maritime, Inc. v. Boats Group, LLC, Case No. 1:25-cv-23663-RKA (S.D. Fla.).