Southern District Of New York Dismisses Eyewear Antitrust Claims
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  • Southern District Of New York Dismisses Eyewear Antitrust Claims

    10/06/2025

    On September 26, 2025, Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted eyewear maker EssilorLuxottica’s and related business entities’ (“defendants”) motion to dismiss two proposed class actions suits by direct and indirect purchasers of defendants’ products (“plaintiffs”) accusing defendants of engaging in an anticompetitive scheme to monopolize different U.S. consumer eyewear markets. In re Eyewear Antitrust Litig., No. 1:24-cv-04826 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025). The Court held that the two sets of plaintiffs failed to plausibly define the market they accused defendants of monopolizing or attempting to monopolize under Section 2 of the Sherman Act and illegally combining with others to restrain under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

    Plaintiffs, who had been directed to file one consolidated complaint, filed two separate amended complaints against slightly different combinations of EssilorLuxottica entities. Plaintiffs divided themselves into two groups: (1) direct purchasers of goods in the relevant markets from a retail outlet allegedly owned by defendants (“direct purchaser plaintiffs”) and (2) indirect purchasers of defendants’ brand products from unaffiliated third-parties (“indirect purchaser plaintiffs”). While indirect purchaser plaintiffs asserted just one product market, the retail market for premium eyewear, direct purchaser plaintiffs asserted two relevant product markets, the retail market for custom optical lenses and the retail market for premium eyewear. Direct purchaser plaintiffs split the premium eyewear market into two submarkets: (i) the submarket for premium spectacle frames and (ii) the submarket for premium sunglasses including both prescription and non-prescription sunglasses.

    In order to state a claim under either section of the Sherman Act, as a threshold issue, plaintiffs must define the relevant market in which anticompetitive conduct is alleged. Reviewing plaintiffs’ conflicting identifications of the relevant market, the Court noted that it is well established that “[t]he relevant market is defined as all products ‘reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes’” Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 386 F.3d at 496 (2d Cir. 2004). Under this standard, the Court found the indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ product market, the retail market for premium eyewear, to be “manifestly implausible” as there is no consumer for whom prescription lenses are reasonably interchangeable with either spectacle frames or sunglasses. The Court also found direct purchaser plaintiffs’ premium eyewear product market deficient because spectacle frames are not reasonably interchangeable with sunglasses, nor are prescription and non-prescription sunglasses interchangeable with each other. Accordingly, the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims regarding the retail market for premium eyewear.

    With respect to direct purchaser plaintiffs’ claims regarding the retail market for custom optical lenses, the Court found direct purchaser plaintiffs failed to plead non-conclusory allegations that defendants had the ability to control prices or exclude competition and simply asserted that defendants control price because they dominate the market. Direct purchaser plaintiffs alleged that defendants mark-up lenses above marginal cost, but deviations between marginal cost and price are not necessarily evidence of market power. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 109 (2d. Cir 1995). Instead, the Court held direct purchaser plaintiffs were required to allege specific facts from which the Court can reasonably infer that defendants control prices. Though the Court reasoned that direct purchaser plaintiffs’ steering allegations might support an inference of specific intent to monopolize, an attempted monopolization claim also requires a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power, which direct purchaser plaintiffs offered no allegations in support of. Thus, the Court dismissed the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ claims related to the retail market for custom optical lenses.

    The Court gave plaintiffs leave to file a final second amended complaint by October 17, 2025. Nonetheless, the decision reinforces the standards for adequately alleging a plausible market definition and market power.

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