No Shot At Victory: Eastern District Of Michigan Dismisses Monopolization Claims Against Energy Shot Company With Prejudice

On August 29, 2025, U.S. District Judge Jonathan Grey of the Eastern District of Michigan dismissed an action against makers of energy shots, with prejudice, holding that plaintiff failed to plausibly state a claim under the Sherman Act, Lanham Act, or for civil conspiracy. Vitamin Energy, Inc. v. Bhargava, et al., No. 24-13125 (E.D. Mich. 2025). Plaintiff alleged that through a combination of anticompetitive agreements and aggressive litigation tactics, defendants secured exclusive placement for their energy shot products on checkout counters at major retailers. According to the complaint, this preferential placement facilitated defendants’ monopolization or attempted monopolization of the energy shot market in violation of Sherman Act Section 2. Upon consideration of the agreements at issue, which the Court deemed integrated by reference into the pleading, Judge Grey dismissed plaintiff’s antitrust claims for lack of antitrust injury and dismissed the remaining counts as insufficiently pleaded.

Plaintiff and defendants are competing manufacturers of energy shots—compact, 2-oz. caffeine supplements promoted and sold at retail and convenience stores. By virtue of “counter-rack” agreements between manufacturers and retailers, these products are commonly displayed at the point-of-sale, either on the sales counter or beside the register. Here, plaintiff alleged that defendants paid retailers millions of dollars in rebates to secure exclusive counter rack placement for their products while inducing retailers to relegate plaintiff’s products to less desirable shelves. According to plaintiff, without access to these prime counter rack display locations, plaintiff and other energy shot producers cannot “meaningfully compete,” citing as evidence plaintiff’s own decrease in profits at one retail chain after the retailer entered a counter-rack agreement with defendants.

Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of antitrust injury, claiming that plaintiff failed to allege a market-wide injury to competition. The Court agreed, describing plaintiff’s injury as “a natural result of legal competition and not [] an antitrust injury.” Plaintiff could not rely on conclusory allegations that energy shot providers suffered declining sales due to defendants’ agreements without supporting facts. Moreover, Judge Grey observed the fact that plaintiff’s products continued to experience sales in the same stores as defendants’ products, even after being allegedly removed from counter rack displays, undermined plaintiff’s core assertion that defendants entered unlawful exclusivity agreements to maintain a monopoly.

Notably, both plaintiff and defendants entered similar agreements with the same retailer, and although plaintiff described defendants’ agreements as “illegal” and “anticompetitive,” the complaint contained no factual matter suggesting that defendants “used illegitimate means to secure the same type of agreement that [plaintiff] obtained.” As such, the Court reasoned that these agreements are commonplace in the industry and alone cannot constitute harm to competition or antitrust injury.

Having dismissed plaintiff’s Sherman Act claims—and in the absence of facts suggesting a separate, actionable tort—the Court similarly dismissed plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claims. The Court dismissed plaintiff’s false advertising claims on separate grounds.