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National Ratings Business Enjoined From Tying Local Radio Ratings To National Data
01/27/2026Following a three-day evidentiary hearing in December 2025, Judge Jeannette Vargas, of the Southern District of New York, has issued a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from charging a commercially unreasonable rate for its standalone nationwide radio ratings data and enforcing its “Network Policy” set to come into effect this year. Defendant is a major audience-measurement firm that in part supplies local and nationwide radio ratings data used to sell network advertising. Plaintiff, is a U.S. radio broadcast network that operates nearly 400 radio stations across 80+ local markets and sells national ads through a network arm.
Plaintiff primarily earns revenue by selling ad inventory on its radio stations. Tracking the size and engagement of radio audiences is critical for broadcasters to price national and local advertising inventory. Accordingly, broadcast networks like the plaintiff must purchase national and local audience measurements. Historically, plaintiff purchased national ratings data through defendant, while purchasing local ratings data at a lower cost from defendant’s sole local ratings competitor, Eastlan Ratings (“Eastlan”).
Defendant adopted a Network Policy in 2024 for its customers operating both national and local radio stations. For these customers, the Network Policy excludes local ratings from the national product if the customer does not purchase local ratings data, effectively forcing the customers to purchase both national ratings data and local ratings data to receive complete national data. In 2025, when plaintiff was renegotiating with defendant for local and national products, the data subscription price was significantly higher than it had been, especially relative to prices paid in local radio markets. When plaintiff threatened to initiate antitrust litigation, defendant offered plaintiff a standalone comprehensive nationwide ratings package at more than ten times the price Plaintiff currently pays for national ratings. After negotiations reached an impasse, plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin defendant from enforcing the Network Policy.
In its complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant’s Network Policy amounted to willful maintenance of monopoly power through an anticompetitive tying arrangement in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act—that defendant leveraged monopoly power (i.e., 100% market share) in a market for nationwide ratings to coercively tie sales in a second market for local radio ratings data through its Network Policy.
The Court determined that plaintiff was likely to succeed in showing it had antitrust standing to seek injunctive relief under Section 2, as it was likely to succeed in demonstrating the threat of antitrust injury, defined by the Supreme Court as an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Defendant maintained that no antitrust injury had occurred and that this suit is nothing more than “a contract dispute about money.” But the Court disagreed, finding that defendant’s conduct had permitted it to sharply increase prices for nationwide ratings as a standalone product, to more than ten times what plaintiff was paying for nationwide ratings under its prior contract, and far more than defendant charges other customers for nationwide products combined with local market data.
Having established that plaintiff was likely to successfully establish antitrust standing, the Court further concluded that plaintiff was likely to succeed in its Section 2 monopolization claim, where it must be shown that a defendant possesses monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully maintained “that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Defendant did not dispute the alleged relevant markets for local radio ratings data and national ratings data, or that it possessed monopoly power in both markets.
Rather, defendant disputed plaintiff’s claim that the Network Policy amounted to an anticompetitive tie, which in the Second Circuit requires satisfying the following five elements: 1) a tying and a tied product; 2) evidence of actual coercion by the seller that forced the buyer to accept the tied product; 3) sufficient economic power in the tying product market to coerce purchaser acceptance of the tied product; 4) anticompetitive effects in the tied market; and 5) the involvement of a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied market. Gonzalez v. St. Margaret’s House Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1989). Defendant did not challenge plaintiff on the first, third, or fifth prongs, but contended that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a likelihood of proving that defendant had coerced plaintiff to purchase local ratings data and that there were substantial anticompetitive effects in the tied market. The Court sided with plaintiff on both.
On coercion, defendant sought to characterize the Network Policy as a “bundling arrangement” that merely offers nationwide ratings at a discounted rate when purchased with local ratings data. On the contrary, the Court found the record absent of evidence that defendant discounted national ratings when purchased with local ratings, but rather that the Network Policy prevented the sale of complete national data unless local ratings data was also purchased. While defendant ultimately offered complete nationwide data to plaintiff in contract negotiations, the court found this offer was only presented after plaintiff threatened antitrust litigation and was conditioned on a price more than ten times what plaintiff currently pays for national ratings. Accordingly, the court found that plaintiff was likely to succeed in showing that the Network Policy amounted to a coercive tie.
Regarding the alleged anticompetitive effects, defendant asserted that plaintiffs are required to show that an alleged tie actually forecloses competition in the tied market. Defendant argued that the Network Policy did not actually foreclose its only local ratings competitor, Eastlan, because Eastlan would remain capable of competing for business with the many local radio stations that are not impacted by the Network Policy. But the court held that “complete foreclosure” is not the appropriate legal standard. Rather, the Court found that plaintiff was likely to succeed in showing anticompetitive effects because the Network Policy poses a significant entry barrier that prevents Eastlan from achieving scale or industry-wide acceptance.
Having concluded that plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits, the Court further found that plaintiff was likely to show that the imposition of the Network Policy would cause plaintiff irreparable injury, and that the balance of equities tipped in its favor. Accordingly, Judge Vargas issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining defendant from charging a commercially unreasonable rate for its standalone nationwide radio ratings data and enforcing the Network Policy.
As of January 22nd, the Second Circuit has administratively stayed the District Court’s injunction while it considers defendant’s request for a stay pending appeal. The case is Cumulus Media New Holdings Inc. v. The Nielsen Co. (US) LLC, case number 1:25-cv-08581, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
